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 Borges’s Two Refutations of Time
James Van Cleve
Philosophers seldom expect a magically minded man of letters . . . to use valid 
logic; much less in a revealing fashion.
Agassi1 
In his essay “A New Refutation of Time,” Jorge Luis Borges offers two proofs 
of the unreality of time.2   One of these, he tells us, is based on the idealism of 
Berkeley, and the other on Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. 
Borges does not always keep the two arguments separate, but they are indepen-
dent arguments, and I shall reconstruct them as such here.  The Berkeleyan 
argument may be used to refute one aspect of time that Borges deems essential 
to it and the Leibnizian argument to refute another.
It will be useful to begin by identifying three axioms of time order, never 
explicitly stated by Borges, but clearly the targets of his refutation.  If time is 
real, Borges believes, all events must belong to one all-embracing temporal 
system of which the following principles hold: 
1. Given any two events e and f, either e precedes f, or f precedes  
 e, or e and f are simultaneous.3 
2. If e precedes f, then f does not precede e.  (As a corollary, no  
 event precedes itself.)
3. If e precedes f and f precedes g, then e precedes g.
By virtue of Axiom 1, all events belong to a single connected temporal 
system.   By virtue of Axioms 2 and 3, the temporal series is a partial ordering, 
ordered by a relation that is irreflexive and transitive.  In the reconstructions I 
offer below, the Berkeleyan argument shows that Axiom 1 does not hold, while 
the Leibnizian argument shows that Axiom 2 does not hold (or at least that 
Axioms 2 and 3 do not both hold).  If the reality of time requires the truth of 
these axioms, it follows that time is unreal.
 
I.  The Berkeleyan Argument
The “Berkeleyan argument” is not Berkeley’s own argument, as Borges admits, 
but he maintains nonetheless that it is an inevitable consequence of Berkeleyan 
doctrines.  As Borges puts it, “I deny, with the arguments of idealism, the vast 
temporal series which idealism admits” (Irby, p. 222).
The argument consists of three premises, the first two supposedly drawn 
from Berkeley’s philosophy and the third an empirical fact.  The first premise is 
simply the master premise of Berkeley’s idealism, the esse-est-percipi principle:
2
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1.     To be is to be perceived.
The next premise is really an extension of the first, though Borges apparently 
regards it as already implicit in the first:
2.   To be F is to be perceived as being F; for two or more things to stand  
 in relation R is for them to be perceived as standing in R.
In the first premise, we say that being in the sense of existence or Sein is depen-
dent on perception; in the second, we say that being in the sense of predication 
or Sosein is dependent on perception.  In other words, for something to have a 
certain property, it must be perceived as having that property; more generally, 
for two or more things to stand in a certain relation, they must be perceived 
as standing in that relation.  I comment below on whether this extension is 
legitimate; for now I simply note that it is the second of the idealist premises 
that is essential in Borges’s argument.
        The final premise is this:
3.   No one ever perceives the successiveness of events separated by  
 more than a few seconds; nor does anyone ever perceives the simul- 
 taneity of events separated by great distances or occurring in two minds.
History books tell us that the Buddha’s enlightenment preceded the death of 
Socrates by 128 years, but no one perceived the successiveness of these events. 
Again, Captain Isidoro Suarez is said to have decided the Victory of Junin 
at the beginning of August 1824, and supposedly on the same date Thomas 
DeQuincey issued a diatribe against Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre.  But no one 
perceived the simultaneity of these events, Borges tells us, “inasmuch as the 
two men died—the one in the city of Montevideo, the other in Edinburgh—
knowing nothing about each other” (Kerrigan, p. 50).  
When we put premise 2 together with premise 3, we obtain Borges’s conclusion:
4.     The “vast temporal series” admitted by idealism falls apart into   
 unrelated fragments.  There is no stretch of events longer than a few  
 seconds; nor is there any all-embracing system in which (for ex  
 ample) the victory of Suarez is simultaneous with the publication of  
 DeQuincey’s diatribe.
A similar argument would presumably show that there is no all-embracing 
spatial system in which any two objects are at some distance from each other. 
Indeed, Borges seems to think that the denial of space is already explicitly ac-
knowledged by idealists, and that he is only drawing out what idealists should 
say as well about time.4 
I now offer three observations to help elucidate the argument.
~
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Observation 1.  We must note that Borges is not giving the argument that 
many of his readers may surmise.  Those whose acquaintance with Berkeley 
is only superficial (perhaps going no deeper than Borges’s own summary) are 
likely to construe the argument thus:  “For idealists, things in general exist 
only in being perceived. Therefore, time exists only in being perceived.  And 
therefore, time is not real.”  But Berkeley would strenuously protest that second 
‘therefore’.  That a thing exists only in being perceived does not, for Berkeley, 
prejudice its reality in the least; on the contrary, its being perceived is precisely 
what constitutes its reality.5   Borges is well aware of this.  The problem with time 
(or with temporal relations) is not that they are only contents of perception; 
it is that for the most part they are not contents of perception at all.  This is 
well brought out in the following quotation from Borges:
The denial of time involves two negations:  the negation of the 
succession of the terms of a series, the negation of the synchronism 
of the terms in two different series.  In fact, if each term is absolute, 
its relations are reduced to the consciousness that those relations 
exist.  A state precedes another if it is known to be prior; a state of 
G is contemporary to a state of H if it is known to be contemporary. 
(Irby, p. 232)
I think it is clear that Borges’s  “if” should be read as an “if and only if.”
To make the present point in another way, it is not Borges’s view that time 
is an illusion, i.e., a false perception.  With exceptions to be noted, it is not a 
perception at all.  It is rather, as he says, a delusion—a false belief.
Observation 2.   Borges admits that there are some instances in which it is 
true that one event precedes or is simultaneous with another, for he is a believer 
in the “specious present.” I may be able literally to perceive the successiveness 
of events that are only a few seconds apart.  But if events are more than a few 
seconds apart, no one perceives their successiveness, and if two events lie 
outside a single field of view, no one perceives their simultaneity.  These facts 
are sufficient to generate his conclusion.  As he says, 
I deny, in a high number of instances, the existence of succession.  
I deny, in a high number of instances, contemporaneity as well.  
(Kerrigan, p. 50)
They tell me that the present, the “specious present,” of the psy-
chologists, lasts from between several seconds and the smallest 
fraction of a second:  such is the length of the history of the universe. 
(Kerrigan, p. 50)
  
Observation 3.  The Berkeleyan argument is designed to make trouble for Ax-
iom 1, which affirms the connectedness of time.6   It is worth noting, however, 
that it also makes trouble for Axiom 3, the transitivity axiom.  Suppose that 
someone perceives that e precedes f; suppose also that someone (the same 4
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someone or another) perceives that f precedes g; suppose finally that no one 
perceives that e precedes g.  It will follow from Borges’s second premise (which 
we are taking to imply that e precedes f iff someone perceives that e precedes 
f) that the transitivity axiom breaks down.
I now consider three objections to Borges’s argument along with possible 
replies.
Objection 1.  Borges has forgotten all about Berkeley’s God.  God, of course, 
can perceive the relations of events widely separated in space and time even if 
none of us can, and is therefore an exception to the “no one” in Borges’s third 
premise.  In one place Borges even acknowledges this, noting that Berkeley’s 
God is a “ubiquitous spectator whose function is that of lending coherence to 
the world” (Irby, p. 229).
Reply.  It is still of interest to see whether a Berkeley without God could 
avoid Borges’s conclusion.  Borges cites Hume as having gone beyond Berkeley 
by denying not just the existence of matter, but also the existence of spirits, 
and perhaps he thinks that a consistent Berkeley should have been Hume.  In 
any case, he could simply have advertised his argument differently—not as an 
argument that any good Berkeleyan should deny the reality of time, but that 
any good Humean should do so.  
Objection 2.  It may be suggested that a more liberal idealism could recon-
struct much more of the “vast temporal series” than Borges allows.  For example, 
suppose we say that an event e precedes an event z iff there is an intervening 
series of events f, g, h, and so on, such that e is perceived by someone to precede 
f, f is perceived by someone (not necessarily the same someone) to precede 
g, and so on, until we reach z.  That would enable us to say that e precedes z 
even if no one perceives that fact of precedence.  It would also restore the lost 
transitivity axiom.7 
Reply.  True enough.  But Borges’s original argument is based on the empir-
ical premise that no one perceives the successiveness of events separated by 
wide intervals.  It is an equally plausible empirical premise that there simply 
aren’t enough perceivers to pass the torch down through the centuries in the 
way now envisioned.  There will still be events in the “vast temporal series” 
we are trying to recover that are not connected even by chains of perceived 
precedence in the required way.
Objection 3.  This objection challenges the import of Borges’s conclusion 
rather than the argument for it.  Here are two statements by Borges of his thesis, 
in which he takes himself to be denying the reality of time:
There is no such thing as “the life of a man,” nor even “one night 
in his life.”  Each moment we live exists, not the imaginary com-
bination of these moments.  (Kerrigan, p. 51)
I reject the whole in order to exalt each of the parts.  (Irby, p. 232)
But there are some who will say that in remarks such as these, Borges is far 
from denying the reality of time.  On the contrary, he is affirming exactly 
what you must if you take time seriously.  I have in mind those philosophers 5
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often called presentists, who hold that nothing exists but what exists at the 
present.8   In their view, to affirm the existence of the “vast temporal series” 
Borges talks about—otherwise known as McTaggart’s B-series, Williams’s 
“fabric of juxtaposed actualities,” or Quine’s total content of four-dimensional 
spacetime9 —is precisely to do away with the element of passage that is essential 
to the reality of time.
Reply:  To deny that the various events making up the history of the uni-
verse exist as a fabric of juxtaposed actualities is to be a friend rather than a 
foe of time—on this point I agree with the presentists.  But there remains 
plenty in Borges’s argument to which presentists should take exception.  Pre-
sentists certainly want to allow that many things were the case that are not 
the case now,10  and that certain things were the case before other things were 
the case—for example, that Berkeley died before Borges was born.11   But the 
Borgesian idealist must deny precisely such facts as these, or at any rate must 
do so in cases in which no one was perceptually aware of them.   So presentists 
had better find something to question in Borges’s argument after all.
Objection 4.  I come now to the objection I think fundamental.  There are 
two ways in which an idealist might account for the fact that e precedes f (or is 
succeeded by f).  First, he might say that someone perceives that e is succeeded 
by f—a fact we may symbolize as
P(eSf)
Second, he might say that someone has a perception of e followed by a per-
ception of f—a fact we may symbolize as
p(e)Sp(f)  
In short, the idealist might appeal either to the perception of succession or the 
succession of perceptions.  This is a distinction that will be familiar to readers 
of Kant and James.12 
To come to the point, I believe that Berkeley accounts for temporality in 
the second way—as a succession of perceptions.  But Borges, in extending the 
esse-est-percipi principle in the way that he does, assumes that an idealist can 
only account for temporality in the first way—as the perception of succession. 
He thereby saddles Berkeley with an assumption to which he is by no means 
committed.  
That Berkeley accounts for time in the first way is suggested to me by the 
following passage—one of the few in which Berkeley discusses time explicitly:
Time therefore being nothing abstracted from the succession of 
ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit 
must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding 
each other in that same spirit or mind.  (Principles of Human 
Knowledge, section 98).
6
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Berkeley’s main target here is an absolute theory of time such as Newton’s—he 
wants to rule out the possibility of empty time, or time without change, and 
change in his system can only be change in the mental states of a subject.  Thus 
it is that there can be no time without a succession of ideas or perceptions in 
some mind.  The important point for our purposes, however, is that Berkeley 
plainly enough seems to be allowing that there is such a thing as the succession 
of perceptions, and that if you have that, you have time—even if you do not 
have the perception of succession.    
To elaborate, I believe that Berkeley would say something like this. If one 
perception, p(e), is succeeded by another, p(f) that is a basis sufficient unto 
itself for there being a case of genuine succession—of  p(e) by p(f), and de-
rivatively of e by f.  Contrary to what Borges demands, it is not required that 
anyone perceive that e has been followed by f; nor is it required that anyone 
perceive that p(e) has been followed by p(f).  If I see a flash and later hear a 
bang, my two perceptions confer reality individually on the two events (flash 
and bang), and the fact that one perception preceded the other, whether itself 
perceived or no, suffices to make it the case that the flash preceded the bang. 
Facts about the temporal relations of perceivings in this scheme of things are 
basic—they do not require any further grounding in perception.13 
What I am suggesting is that the extension of Berkeley’s esse-est-percipi 
principle involved in passing from premise 1 to premise 2 is illegitimate.  Berke-
ley does indeed hold that no sensible thing exists unless it is perceived—that 
is the master premise of his philosophy.   But he is not committed to holding 
that no fact obtains unless it is perceived as obtaining.   I now present three 
arguments in support of this contention.
First, it seems clear that Berkeley would want to allow that the following 
could be a fact:  I have experienced seventeen twinges of pain in my shoulder 
since arising this morning.  Yet what if no one was counting?  Wouldn’t Berkeley 
say that the seventeen individual experiences are enough to underwrite the 
fact that seventeen twinges occurred, even if there was no single summative 
experience—no experience of the fact that the total to date is seventeen?  If so, 
we have an example of a fact that can obtain without being perceived to obtain.
Second, it may well be that Berkeley holds that monadic facts cannot ob-
tain without being perceived to obtain.  It is a characteristic Berkeleyan thesis 
that ideas are entirely passive and inert, which he supports in one place by the 
following argument:
For since they [our ideas] and every part of them exist only in the 
mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived; 
but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, 
will not perceive in them any power or activity. (Principles of Human 
Knowledge, section 25)
On the strength of passages such as this, Phillip Cummins has attributed 
7
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to Berkeley a thesis he calls “the Manifest Qualities Thesis:” no individual 
thing ever has any quality (or nonrelational property) unless it is perceived as 
having it.14   But I doubt, as Cummins does, that Berkeley would extend this 
thesis to cover relational properties, so as to imply that a relational fact can 
hold only if it is perceived as holding.  Berkeley explicitly says in section 89 of 
the Principles that you can perceive the things related by a relation without 
perceiving the relation itself.  And facts about succession and simultaneity 
are, of course, relational facts.
Third, if no fact whatever holds without being perceived to hold, we get an 
infinite regress that Berkeley would surely repudiate.   Suppose an object o exists 
because someone, S, perceives o.   If all facts, including even relational facts, 
depend on being perceived, we will have to say further:  someone, S', perceives 
that S perceives o; someone, S", perceives that S' perceives that S perceives 
o, and so on, without end.  Is there any impossibility in this?   Arguably not; 
perhaps the perceivers in the series from S' onwards are all identical with God, 
who can have perceptions of unlimited complexity.  On the other hand, if the 
idea is that all facts are constituted by the perception of them, the regress is 
arguably vicious.  But whether it is vicious or not, I doubt that Berkeley would 
embrace any such regress.  He holds that spirits are unperceivable, so not even 
God could perceive that a certain spirit perceives a certain object or fact.
I have been arguing so far that Borges is wrong to think that Berkeley’s ide-
alism must demolish the vast temporal system that many believe in.  But what 
if Borges adopted as his own premise a more thoroughgoing idealism, with or 
without Berkeley’s blessing?  How would we answer him then?
The more thoroughgoing idealism would say that relational facts do not hold 
unless they are perceived as holding, and perhaps more ambitiously yet, that no 
fact whatever holds without being perceived as holding.  In opposition to such 
super-idealism, I advance three points.  First, it would engender the regress of 
perceivers (or at least of endlessly complicated facts perceived) that we have 
lately contemplated.  In another of his essays, Borges expresses skepticism about 
precisely such a regress.15   Second, super-idealism would undermine some of the 
premises of Borges’s own argument.  “No one ever perceives the simultaneity 
of events separated by great distances”—does anyone ever perceive that fact? 
It seems that unrestricted negative existential propositions are not properly 
objects of perception themselves.  Third, super-idealism would undermine itself. 
“No fact ever obtains without being perceived as obtaining”—however that 
is known, I doubt that it is through perception.  Thus super-idealism is highly 
problematic, for reasons I think Borges himself would acknowledge.
I close this section with a look at one puzzling thing Borges says.  Here in 
full is the passage about Suarez and DeQuincey:
At the beginning of August 1824, Captain Isidoro Suarez, at the head 
of a squadron of Peruvian hussars, decided the victory of Junin; at 
the beginning of August 1824, DeQuincey issued a diatribe against 
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre; these deeds were not contemporaneous 
8
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(they are now), inasmuch as the two men died—the one in the city 
of Montevideo, the other in Edinburgh—knowing nothing about 
each other.  (Kerrigan p. 50)
Why does he insert that parenthetical, “they are now”?  I conjecture that he 
has reasoned as follows.  The two events were not contemporaneous when 
they happened (if we can even speak of such a “when”), because no one then 
perceived them as being contemporaneous.  “They are now” (i.e., it is now 
true that they were contemporaneous), because we are led to believe as much 
by history books or by Borges’s own essay.  
I fear that Borges’s cleverness has here gotten the better of him.  Let us set 
aside the objection that in the idealist framework within which he is working, 
it is perceiving and not believing that confers reality on temporal facts.  Were 
Borges really to hold that a present cognitive attitude (be it belief, perception, 
or some other) can create past contemporaneity between events that were not 
contemporaneous before, he would contradict what he says a sentence later: 
“Neither vengeance nor pardon nor prisons nor even oblivion can modify the 
invulnerable past.”16 
 
II.  The Leibnizian Argument
I turn now to Borges’s second argument against the reality of time.  Like the 
first argument, this one combines a philosopher’s principle with an empirical 
premise to deduce that an axiom of time order is violated.
Borges introduces the argument as follows:  
Let us consider a life in whose course there is an abundance of 
repetitions:  mine, for example.  I never pass in front of the Re-
coleta without remembering that my father, my grandparents and 
great-grandparents are buried there . . . . [E]very time the wind brings 
me the smell of eucalyptus, I think of Androgue in my childhood 
. . . . (Irby, p. 223)
He goes on to suggest that he has had a number of totally déjà vu experiences, 
involving exactly the same combination of elements as in earlier experienc-
es—the same sights, the same smells, the same thoughts of childhood, and so 
on.  He concludes the argument as follows:
We can postulate, in the mind of an individual . . . two identical 
moments.  Once this identity is postulated, we may ask:  Are not 
these identical moments the same?  Is not one single repeated term 
sufficient to break down and confuse the series of time?  (Irby, pp. 
223-24)
Here is how I reconstruct Borges’s reasoning:
~
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1. There can be—and indeed there actually have been—episodes e and e',  
 one following the other by several years, that are perfectly indiscern- 
 ible.
2. If e and e' are indiscernible, they are one and the same (by Leibniz’s  
 Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles).
3. Therefore, e = e' (from 1 and 2).
4. Therefore, e precedes itself (from 1 and 3)—in violation of the corol- 
 lary of Axiom 2.
I now present and discuss several possible objections to this argument.
Objection 1.  This objection is directed at the first premise.  It is infinitely 
unlikely, some might say, that one experience would ever be a total repetition 
of another.  Surely there must be some difference between e and e', if only in 
the relations they bear to other objects or events in one’s environment—for 
example, some difference in the earth’s distance from Venus at the times of 
the two experiences, or some difference in the molecular composition of the 
blades of grass in the Recoleta.
It might be thought that elements of Borges’s first argument could help in 
meeting this objection.  Holding fast to his supposedly Berkeleyan principles, 
Borges could say that if no one perceived the proximity of e to these mole-
cules and of e' to those, then no such relational differences between e and e' 
obtained.  The relevant properties of e and e' are exhausted by the properties 
they are perceived as having.
It would be unwise, however, to bring in the first argument in this way, for 
the first argument causes more trouble than it quells.  On what basis do we 
say that e preceded e' by so many years, given that in all probability no one 
perceived the succession of events that are alleged to intervene between them? 
Moreover, if no relations obtain but perceived relations, on what basis do we 
say that e and e' are indiscernible?  The subject would have to discern their 
indiscernibility; is that not to imply that e' carried with it some recollection of 
e?  And yet we may stipulate that e itself was absorbed in the sights and scents 
of the moment, unaccompanied by any recollection.17 
It would be better, then, to let the Leibnizian argument stand on its own, 
without any reliance on the Berkeleyan.  Is there now any way to defend the 
first premise?  Yes, there is.  The defender could point out that the differences 
cited above between e and e' are all relational differences.  We are still free 
to postulate (even if we do not find in our own lives) repeated events that are 
just alike in all their intrinsic features.  Moreover, it is precisely such likeness 
in intrinsic features that Leibniz meant by indiscernibility, so the rest of the 
argument may proceed as before.
Unfortunately, this response to Objection 1 only exacerbates Objection 2, 
10
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to which I now turn.
Objection 2.  This objection is directed at the second premise, in which 
Borges invokes the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII).  To set the 
stage for the objection, we must distinguish (as is commonly done) between 
two forms of this principle.  According to the relational or weak form, if two 
objects or events are indiscernible in the sense that they share all their prop-
erties (relational as well as nonrelational), they are really one and the same. 
Putting it in the contrapositive mode, any objects or events that are genuinely 
distinct must differ in at least some of their properties, though perhaps only in 
relational properties.  According to the nonrelational or strong form, if two 
objects or events are indiscernible in the sense that they share all their intrinsic 
properties, they are really one and the same.  Putting it in the contrapositive 
mode again, any objects or events that are genuinely distinct must differ in at 
least one intrinsic property. 
Leibniz’s philosophy is committed to PII in its strong form.  This is shown 
for one thing by the way in which Leibniz derives PII from the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason:  if two grains of sand differed only in their relational 
properties (e.g., in their distances from the Great Pyramid), there could be no 
sufficient reason why one grain was placed here and the other there.  Borges 
is also committed to PII in its strong form.  This, at any rate, is the verdict we 
reached above in discussing Objection 1.
Now we are ready to state Objection 2.  Although some philosophers 
maintain that PII in its weak form is a tenable principle, most find that PII 
in its strong form is thoroughly implausible.18   Is it not perfectly conceivable 
that there should be two billiard balls, or two raindrops, or two electrons that 
are perfectly alike in all their intrinsic properties?  If so, the form of Leibniz’s 
principle that Borges’s argument requires has a strong presumption against it.
We may note as well that a proponent of the Leibnizian argument will fall 
into incoherence if he (a) concedes that Borges’s indiscernible experiences do 
differ in their relational properties (e.g., in what else is happening elsewhere in 
the universe at the same time), yet (b) insists that the experiences are none-
theless numerically identical in virtue of sharing all their intrinsic properties. 
For he would then be holding that numerically identical items can differ in 
their relational properties, which is absurd.  One thing Leibniz was certainly 
right about is the Indiscernibility of Identicals!
Objection 3.  The two objections we have considered so far may be combined 
into a dilemma:  if “indiscernible” means “having all the same properties”, 
premise 1 is false, and if “indiscernible” means “having all the same intrinsic 
properties”, premise 2 is false.  The objection to be considered now arises even 
if we accept both premises and the conclusion that follows from them.
The conclusion is that there are events that precede themselves, which 
Borges takes to represent a breakdown, a confounding, or a disintegration of 
time.  But does it really?  Although I am inclined to agree with Borges on this 
point, it must be noted that there are thinkers who do not take the irreflexiv-
ity of temporal precedence as sacrosanct.  Henri Bois objected to Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of eternal return that it was not what it purported to be—that the 11
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supposedly infinitely repeating linear sequence ABCDE A'B'C'D'E', etc. would 
really be a loop, given the identity of A and A', B and B', and so on, that would 
be required if we accept Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles.19   It is not my 
purpose to endorse this application of Leibniz’s principle, which I have already 
questioned.  It is rather to point out that Bois apparently takes seriously the 
possibility of an event’s preceding itself:  in his looping version of time, A pre-
cedes other events that precede A, and A therefore precedes itself.20   In other 
words, the failure of our irreflexivity axiom is not taken to be a breakdown 
of time, but is taken instead to be precisely what is involved in looping time. 
In a similar vein, Gödel and others have pointed out there are solutions to 
the field equations of general relativity that involve closed timelike curves, 
in which an event is preceded by itself.21   If one assumes that what is possible 
for physics is possible for metaphysics—a contentious issue, of course—then 
there is nothing impossible about an event that happens before it happens.
At any rate, there is arguably nothing impossible about an event’s preceding 
itself if it happens as part of a loop in time.  Matters are otherwise if it happens 
as part of a linear series such as ABCDAXYZ, in which the second occurrence 
of A is identified with the first.  Here numerically identical events would have 
different sequels, in violation of the Indiscernibility of Identicals.  This would 
indeed be a “breakdown” of time, just as Borges alleges—but a breakdown 
forced upon us only if we accept the strong version of PII.     
Conclusion.  Borges tells us that he does not really believe the conclusion of 
his own arguments, but he also intimates that he wishes he could.  I cannot help 
his unbelief.  Though the logic of both of Borges’s arguments is valid, neither 
of them is fully compelling in its premises.  One rests on an implausibly strong 
idealism, the other on an implausibly strong version of Leibniz’s indiscernibility 
principle.  Consideration of his arguments can nonetheless be revealing—of 
the need even for idealists to admit facts not constituted by perception; of the 
significance of the distinction between relational and nonrelational versions 
of Leibniz’s indiscernibility principle; and of the possibility that failures in the 
normal axioms of time order represent not the disintegration of time but of 
alternative topological structures for it.22 
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